Tag: Elbridge Gerry

If an adjective creates a redundancy, does preceding it with two other adjectives give the Supreme Court a reason to venture where it has never gone before? The justices should, like Ulysses, listen to this siren song but bind themselves from obeying it. Tuesday’s issue is whether the court should attempt something for which it has neither an aptitude nor any constitutional warrant — concocting criteria for deciding when (adjective two) excessive partisan gerrymandering becomes (adjective three) unconstitutional. Gerrymandering is generally as surreptitious as a brass band and is, always and everywhere, as political as lemonade is lemony. Until 1962, the court stayed away from the inherently political process of the drawing of district lines by legislatures organized along partisan lines because the Constitution is unambiguous: “The times, places and manner of holding elections for senators and representatives, shall be prescribed in each state by the legislature thereof.” There are enough open-textured terms in the Constitution (“establishment” of religion, “unreasonable” searches, “cruel” punishments, etc.) So, the Constitution is explicit: Congress, not the judiciary, is the federal remedy for alleged defects in the drawing of congressional districts. The political branches of the state and federal governments are assigned to deal with the inherently value-laden politics of drawing district lines. These include criteria for measuring unconstitutional excesses in the common practices of “cracking” (dispersing one party’s voters across districts dominated by the other party) and “packing” (one party concentrating the other party’s voters into supermajorities in a few districts). And the political science professoriate stands ready to eagerly tutor the court about “wasted votes” resulting from “efficiency gaps.” Today, people who are unhappy about North Carolina’s gerrymandering argue (as a lower court did) that “the Constitution does not authorize state redistricting bodies to engage in … partisan gerrymandering.” (Emphasis added.) The Constitution is silent regarding limits on state legislatures’ partisan redistricting practices and is explicit regarding Congress’ exclusive power to modify these practices.

The Constitution makes clear that legislative redistricting is a matter for the states and Congress, not the courts, to sort out. If an adjective creates a redundancy, does preceding it with two other adjectives give the Supreme Court a reason to venture where it has never gone before? The practice the court will consider is (adjective one) “partisan gerrymandering.” This modifier, however, does not modify; there is no other kind of gerrymandering. Tuesday’s issue is whether the court should attempt something for which it has neither an aptitude nor any constitutional warrant — concocting criteria for deciding when (adjective two) excessive partisan gerrymandering becomes (adjective three) unconstitutional. Until 1962, the court stayed away from the inherently political process of the drawing of district lines by legislatures organized along partisan lines because the Constitution is unambiguous: “The times, places and manner of holding elections for senators and representatives, shall be prescribed in each state by the legislature thereof.” There are enough open-textured terms in the Constitution (“establishment” of religion, “unreasonable” searches, “cruel” punishments, etc.) Furthermore, the political realists who framed the Constitution, and who understood the pervasiveness of partisanship, added the following to the elections clause quoted above: Congress may “at any time by law make or alter such regulations” as the states might write regarding congressional elections. So, the Constitution is explicit: Congress, not the judiciary, is the federal remedy for alleged defects in the drawing of congressional districts. The political branches of the state and federal governments are assigned to deal with the inherently value-laden politics of drawing district lines. And the political-science professoriate stands ready to eagerly tutor the court about “wasted votes” resulting from “efficiency gaps.” Today, people who are unhappy about North Carolina’s gerrymandering argue (as a lower court did) that “the Constitution does not authorize state redistricting bodies to engage in . The Constitution is silent regarding limits on state legislatures’ partisan redistricting practices and is explicit regarding Congress’s exclusive power to modify these practices.

WASHINGTON — If an adjective creates a redundancy, does preceding it with two other adjectives give the Supreme Court a reason to venture where it has never gone before? The justices should, like Ulysses, listen to this siren song but bind themselves from obeying it. Tuesday’s issue is whether the court should attempt something for which it has neither an aptitude nor any constitutional warrant — concocting criteria for deciding when (adjective two) excessive partisan gerrymandering becomes (adjective three) unconstitutional. Gerrymandering is generally as surreptitious as a brass band and is, always and everywhere, as political as lemonade is lemony. Until 1962, the court stayed away from the inherently political process of the drawing of district lines by legislatures organized along partisan lines because the Constitution is unambiguous: “The times, places and manner of holding elections for senators and representatives, shall be prescribed in each state by the legislature thereof.” There are enough open-textured terms in the Constitution (“establishment” of religion, “unreasonable” searches, “cruel” punishments, etc.) So, the Constitution is explicit: Congress, not the judiciary, is the federal remedy for alleged defects in the drawing of congressional districts. The political branches of the state and federal governments are assigned to deal with the inherently value-laden politics of drawing district lines. These include criteria for measuring unconstitutional excesses in the common practices of “cracking” (dispersing one party’s voters across districts dominated by the other party) and “packing” (one party concentrating the other party’s voters into supermajorities in a few districts). And the political science professoriate stands ready to eagerly tutor the court about “wasted votes” resulting from “efficiency gaps.” Today, people who are unhappy about North Carolina’s gerrymandering argue (as a lower court did) that “the Constitution does not authorize state redistricting bodies to engage in … partisan gerrymandering.” (Emphasis added.) The Constitution is silent regarding limits on state legislatures’ partisan redistricting practices and is explicit regarding Congress’ exclusive power to modify these practices.

If an adjective creates a redundancy, does preceding it with two other adjectives give the Supreme Court a reason to venture where it has never gone before? The justices should, like Ulysses, listen to this siren song but bind themselves from obeying it. Tuesday’s issue is whether the court should attempt something for which it has neither an aptitude nor any constitutional warrant — concocting criteria for deciding when (adjective two) excessive partisan gerrymandering becomes (adjective three) unconstitutional. Gerrymandering is generally as surreptitious as a brass band and is, always and everywhere, as political as lemonade is lemony. Until 1962, the court stayed away from the inherently political process of the drawing of district lines by legislatures organized along partisan lines because the Constitution is unambiguous: “The times, places and manner of holding elections for senators and representatives, shall be prescribed in each state by the legislature thereof.” There are enough open-textured terms in the Constitution (“establishment” of religion, “unreasonable” searches, “cruel” punishments, etc.) So, the Constitution is explicit: Congress, not the judiciary, is the federal remedy for alleged defects in the drawing of congressional districts. The political branches of the state and federal governments are assigned to deal with the inherently value-laden politics of drawing district lines. These include criteria for measuring unconstitutional excesses in the common practices of “cracking” (dispersing one party’s voters across districts dominated by the other party) and “packing” (one party concentrating the other party’s voters into supermajorities in a few districts). And the political science professoriate stands ready to eagerly tutor the court about “wasted votes” resulting from “efficiency gaps.” Today, people who are unhappy about North Carolina’s gerrymandering argue (as a lower court did) that “the Constitution does not authorize state redistricting bodies to engage in ... partisan gerrymandering.” (Emphasis added.) The Constitution is silent regarding limits on state legislatures’ partisan redistricting practices and is explicit regarding Congress’ exclusive power to modify these practices.